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
Santa Rosa Police Department

An Independent After-Action Report on the SRPD's Response to High-Profile Events in Late May and Early June 2020

CONDUCTED ON BEHALF OF THE CITY OF SANTA ROSA

FINAL REPORT

February 22, 2021



 HILLARD HEINTZE

A Jensen Hughes Company

February 22, 2021

Mr. Sean McGlynn
City Manager
City of Santa Rosa
100 Santa Rosa Avenue
Santa Rosa, California 95404


Dear Mr. McGlynn:

I am pleased to inform you that we have completed our after-action report on law enforcement practices based on the Santa Rosa Police Department's (SRPD) response to the high-profile events that occurred in late May and early June 2020.

We thank everyone who assisted our team during this assessment, especially you, your office and the SRPD. We appreciate that law enforcement agencies like yours are taking steps to ensure that their critical and sensitive work meets the expectations that your communities expect and deserve.

We commend the SRPD for its forward thinking and commitment to concepts and principles of the Incident Command System (ICS). Although all incidents are different, from combatting wildfires to responding to protests, the ICS principles provide a framework for command and control and decision making to ensure effective, coordinated responses. We believe the findings and recommendations in this report will help the SRPD further improve its already exceptional process. We look forward to presenting this report to the Santa Rosa City Council. Thank you for allowing us to assist you as you strive for continuous improvement of the SRPD.

Sincerely,
Hillard Heintze, A Jensen Hughes Company



Robert L. Davis
Practice Lead and Senior Vice President
Law Enforcement Consulting



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Executive Summary

Background: Understanding the Broader Context

Like cities across the country, protests occurred in the City of Santa Rosa following George Floyd's death in Minneapolis, Minnesota on May 25, 2020. The first protest in Santa Rosa started peacefully in Old Courthouse Square on May 30, but later that night, individuals engaged in violence and looting. This pattern of peaceful protests in the day and violence at night repeated over several days. Few public safety agencies faced the sustained violence and civil unrest that the Santa Rosa Police Department (SRPD) experienced.

The SRPD has significant experience with protests stemming from a similar controversial incident in which a Sonoma County Sheriff's Office deputy shot and killed teenager Andy Lopez in 2013. This incident sparked protests immediately after Lopez's death, as well as annual protests on his birthday. Although many of the protests focused on Lopez's death had high attendance and occurred in the Old Courthouse Square, they could not fully prepare the SRPD and the assisting agencies for the level of hostility and civil disobedience that occurred following Floyd's death.

Purpose: What We Set Out to Achieve

At the City of Santa Rosa's request, we developed a comprehensive after-action report analyzing the response by the SRPD and other city departments' to the peaceful protests and civil unrest on May 30 and 31, and June 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, 2020. For this engagement, the Hillard Team reviewed:

- + The planning, strategy and response by the SRPD and other City of Santa Rosa departments to the peaceful protests and civil unrest
- + Police reports, intelligence reports and dispatch reports associated with the incidents
- + Written Incident Action Plans for the incidents
- + Training plans and records pertaining to crowd-control and use-of-force tactics
- + Policies and procedures related to the police operations for the incidents
- + Body-worn camera (BWC) footage and other digital media associated with the incidents

We also spoke to city leadership, as well as some community members, to learn more about first-hand experiences during these events. We also sought to gain first-hand knowledge and insights regarding the efforts of the City's public safety personnel and their regional partners as they planned and implemented their operational plans.

We compiled our research and analysis into key findings and recommendations to provide the City and the SRPD with a strategic roadmap that could serve to assist them as they consider additions or updates for the operations, policies and protocols for similar events in the future.



Interviews: Who We Tapped for Insights

A key to a proper after-action report is to interview personnel involved with the planning and implementation efforts for the events being assessed. To that end, a significant portion of our in-person and virtual interviews included:

- + SRPD command staff members
- + SRPD Incident Management Team (IMT) personnel
- + SRPD personnel assigned to the field during the protests
- + SRPD dispatchers and dispatch supervisors
- + Personnel from other local agencies who responded to the incidents.

We also spoke with city officials, as well some community members and business owners, to gain their insights about the SRPD's response.

Assessors: The Hillard Heintze Team

Rob Davis, Senior Vice President, Law Enforcement Consulting



Robert Davis is a highly regarded and innovative national leader in policing and public safety with extensive experience assessing federal, state and local law enforcement agencies across the U.S. Rob served in a variety of capacities during his 30-year-career with the San Jose Police Department (SJPD), including as the Chief of Police for seven years. As chief, Rob also served as the President of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. He provided consulting services for the U.S. State Department. Since retiring from SJPD, Rob has been involved in numerous assessments of police departments, including serving as the Project Director for Hillard Heintze's Department of Justice Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance contract.

Robert Boehmer, Esq., Vice President, Law Enforcement Consulting



Robert Boehmer is an experienced facilitator, trainer and public speaker with expertise in collaborative problem solving, community policing, partnership development and information sharing. For the past several years, he has facilitated sessions for the Department of Homeland Security's Building Communities of Trust Initiative, focusing on developing trust among law enforcement, fusion centers and the communities they serve. As a Vice President in the Law Enforcement Consulting practice at Hillard Heintze, Robert manages complex law enforcement assessments and helps police agencies transform their organizations and adopt national best practices and industry standards central to improving accountability, transparency and community trust.



Chad M. McGinty, Senior Director, Security Risk Management



Chad McGinty brings nearly three decades of law enforcement, public safety, emergency preparedness and security leadership experience to his role as Senior Director at Hillard Heintze. Chad served in the Ohio State Highway Patrol for nearly 28 years, starting as a Trooper in 1989 and later serving as Sergeant, Lieutenant and Captain before joining the Senior Staff as Major, Commander of Field Operations in 2014. He concluded his tenure by coordinating and leading the crowd control/field force response for the 2016 Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio. Chad implemented a sophisticated staging and response for 1,400 field force officers from 18 different agencies and 15 states.

Michael Dirden, Esq, Senior Advisor, Law Enforcement Consulting



Michael Dirden joined Hillard Heintze following a long and successful career with the Houston Police Department. As the Executive Assistant Chief of Police, Michael provided leadership and oversight for the department's Investigative, Strategic and Field Operations, including accountability for Patrol Operations, Traffic Enforcement, the Mental Health Division, Apartment Enforcement and Differential Police.



Key Findings

1. The SRPD embraces the concepts and principles of the Incident Command System (ICS).

The ICS is a standardized approach to the command, control and coordination of on-scene incident management and provides a common hierarchy within which personnel can be effective. The SRPD's integration of the ICS across its operations is exceptional, exceeding what is found in many law enforcement agencies. The SRPD believes the ICS is beneficial in managing not only emergencies and incidents, but also routine police operations, special events, community engagements and tactical operations. The Department pushes ICS principles from the top of the organization down to its patrol officers, who learn ICS through training and the integration of the ICS with their daily duties. Additionally, the SRPD has provided extensive training to numerous commanders and supervisors in ICS principles and tactics.

As result of this emphasis on ICS, all Department employees are familiar with the concept and have developed a degree of competence in exercising its principles. This increased level of operational knowledge and experience with the ICS allows the SRPD to have effective command and control when emergencies or large-scale incidents arise.

2. The SRPD's dedicated Incident Management Team (IMT) is a best practice, which facilitates effective and efficient management oversight and review of all Department events, incidents or operations.

The Department appoints the IMT members through a formal selection process that seeks the best candidates who meet the IMT job descriptions' requirements for knowledge, skills and abilities. However, the position on the IMT is an addition to the members' primary responsibilities.

When an event or incident requires the activation of the Department Operations Center (DOC) for crisis management, the IMT members quickly assemble and begin the incident management needed for each event.

3. The SRPD's process that allows for early intervention when planning and requires a multi-disciplinary review is a best practice that contributed to the SRPD's preparedness and effective response to the civil unrest in May and June 2020.

The SRPD developed a structured process to respond to information and intelligence reports about upcoming events. The IMT's Planning Section Chief serves as the special events coordinator, assigned to the Traffic Bureau. The Planning Section Chief's responsibilities include oversight of the intelligence monitoring and reporting functions and the development of pre-incident reports created from their review of information regarding events, incidents or operations, as well as information from



public officials, officers, the community, open-source reporting and social media monitoring. The Planning Section Chief reviews any discovered or reported information, creates a pre-incident report and makes a recommendation about how the SRPD should respond. The Planning Section Chief forwards this form to the IMT commander to review and then provide to the broader command staff. We believe this process allowed the SRPD to be better prepared for the civil unrest in May and June 2020 than other public safety agencies facing similar events. This planning proved useful as without it, the Department may not have had the DOC or specialty teams in place to promptly respond to the incident.

4. The lack of available experienced commanders contributed to the SRPD's ineffective span of control during the early days of the protests and civil unrest.

The number of individuals and the level of civil disobedience, destruction and violence exceeded the SRPD's expectations and experience level, as was the case for public safety agencies across the country at that time. Many agencies had not previously experienced such civil unrest in which the individuals' violent and sustained actions exceeded the agency's planning, training and staffing. Although the SRPD was prepared and deployed its Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and Mobile Field Force (MFF) teams in advance of the first days of the protests, the designation of one tactical commander to lead the effort was insufficient.

As the incident unfolded and the SRPD deployed resources, the ability for one tactical commander to maintain adequate command and oversight of events quickly diminished. The Department acknowledged this shortfall in personnel allocation and has assigned additional commanders for subsequent protests.

Throughout our interviews and review of the operational aspects of the tactical and field response, we called out this span-of-control issue, and senior leadership agreed that it was not a sustainable plan. Although the commanders and field officers with whom we spoke were complimentary of the tactical commander's experience and ability, they acknowledged that the tactical commander had too much responsibility during the protests and riot incidents on May 30th. When the SRPD assigned additional commanders during subsequent protests beginning on May 31st, the Department experienced a significant improvement in the span of control. However, when we examined the command assignments, it became readily apparent that the Department had very few commanders to draw upon and fewer with the experience and skill level to operate effectively in such an environment. This apparent void in command positions, coupled with the retirement of tenured officers, one of which occurred just before our visit, represents a significant challenge in succession planning for the SRPD.



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- 5. The SRPD continually assessed the protest activities and the effectiveness of its operational responses to them, which allowed the Department to adapt well and improve its tactics and response accordingly.**

The Department engaged in an ongoing real-time assessment in the DOC throughout the multiple days of protests. As the IMT and tactical commanders worked through their strategic plans, they analyzed the outcomes and had robust discussions during and after the protests to determine what adaptations were necessary.

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- 6. The SRPD did not initially have a formalized process whereby the outgoing Incident Commander shared information with the incoming Incident Commander. As a result, the incoming Incident Commander was hampered by not having information about tactics and incidents from the night, which would have allowed the SRPD to assess and adjust its response accordingly.**

During the first few days of protests, when the operational period ended in the early morning, the IMT would conduct an informal debriefing session to discuss lessons learned. However, when the next operational period began the following afternoon, the outgoing Incident Commander did not share information with the incoming Incident Commander.

After the third Incident Commander rotation, this problem was identified and an information exchange was established between the Incident Commander's to ensure pertinent information – such as lessons learned, successes and challenges – were communicated.



Overview of the Protests and Civil Unrest in May and June 2020

George Floyd's death sparked protests across the nation and Santa Rosa was no exception. We focused on the protests that began on May 30 and lasted through early June; however, additional protests continued to occur with great frequency throughout June, July and into August. Although many cities experienced more violent and catastrophic protests, few endured the rigorous day-after-day protests that Santa Rosa and its law enforcement partners faced.

On May 28, the SRPD intelligence analyst learned that a popular location for protests, the Old Courthouse Square, was designated as the location for a protest on the afternoon of May 30. The SRPD deployed additional personnel, specifically SWAT and MFF, for crowd control should the need arise.

On May 30 and each day after leading to June 5, peaceful protests occurred in the afternoon and as night fell, individuals engaged in widespread civil disobedience, vandalism, looting and attacks on officers. Each day, as it got closer to nightfall, SRPD officers noted a change in the crowds. The younger, more aggressive and hostile crowds in the evenings blocked intersections; surrounded vehicles and pulled people out of them; spray painted buildings, cars and streets; set small fires; launched fireworks and threw rocks, bottles, branches, rebar and chunks of broken concrete at officers; broke windows and looted retail stores. Additionally, a large crowd marched onto the Highway 101, halting traffic.

The large groups moved about the city fluidly, creating a challenge for law enforcement personnel to attempt to move, contain or control the crowd. Individuals frequently engaged in hostile actions toward officers during the evening. The groups would engage officers, move away, vandalize property and await officers to approach before re-engaging and throwing objects at the officers.

Each day, the SRPD provided individuals ample opportunity to exercise their First Amendment rights to assemble without law enforcement intervention, in some instances for several hours. However, each evening culminated in individuals clashing with law enforcement personnel who were attempting to address the unlawful behaviors. Law enforcement personnel gave dispersal orders, announced curfews and when non-compliant crowds persisted in unlawful behaviors such as attacks on officers, used chemical agents and less-lethal munitions.

Following these events, the SRPD evaluated its planning and response during the protests in May and early June, applying lessons learned. The Department committed to engaging in a continual learning process whereby it reviews each protest and subsequent law enforcement response to identify opportunities to improve, enhance or continue with a given response.



Community Perspectives

The City of Santa Rosa asked us to provide additional context regarding the protests and the overall relationships between the SRPD and the community. In July 2020, the Sonoma County Commission on Human Rights issued a report titled, “Human Rights Violations in Santa Rosa California Policing the Black Lives Matter Protests.” This report provides background information, describes some historical concerns with policing in Sonoma County and describes perspectives from protestors regarding the SRPD’s and mutual aid agencies’ use-of-force tactics related to the protests in late May and early June 2020. The report recommended an independent review of the SRPD’s use-of-force policies, practices and alleged abuses detailed in the report. We did not investigate the specific use of force incidents identified in the Human Rights Commission Report as it was not within our scope of review.

As requested by the City of Santa Rosa, we interviewed several community stakeholders who attended or witnessed the protests or expressed concerns about the SRPD and its relationship with the community. By most accounts, the afternoon protests were peaceful. Interviewees indicated that by evening, those participating in the crowd skewed younger and were increasingly more unruly. Some interviewees perceived that agitators took advantage of the anger of young people in the crowd and created disarray. Others indicated that the police showing up in riot gear increased the aggression of the crowd.

Most noted that the situation became violent and unruly, and some indicated that the SRPD did the best that it could do given the actions of those in the large crowd. For example, some interviewees expressed a level of disbelief that those in the crowd so quickly damaged, disabled and moved the barriers intended to prevent vehicles from entering the square where the protestors assembled.

Echoing the Human Rights Commission report, some interviewees raised concerns that the SRPD used excessive violence during the events. Interviewees were also critical of the SRPD’s arrest procedures on the night of June 2nd. For example, they accused the SRPD of ordering youth to disperse and then “kettling” them,¹ leaving no avenue for them to disperse. The interviewees felt that the SRPD’s conduct in the mass arrest on Mendocino Avenue was improper.

Interviewees noted their belief that the SRPD gave preferential treatment to white arrestees. Additionally, some interviewees reported that they thought counter-protestors and demonstrators who supported the police received police protection, while Black Lives Matter protesters faced police officers in riot gear.

¹ The Human Rights Commission report states that kettling is designed to force a crowd to smaller areas from which the crowd members cannot escape. It is an escalatory tactic that often results in increased use of force.



Although most interviewees expressed some concerns about the SRPD, many were optimistic that the SRPD and the community can move forward in a positive manner. One interviewee noted that the SRPD had a strained relationship with the community before the protests, but the protests brought some issues to light and the City and the SRPD are now taking steps to engage more with the community. However, interviewees indicated that some missteps occurred as the SRPD attempted to increase its community engagement. For example, the City and the SRPD met with protestors to discuss their concerns, then issued a press release claiming the officers' actions complied with the Department's policies and procedures. One interviewee stated that this press release increased distrust in the community. However, many interviewees believe the SRPD was well respected in most of the community. To improve trust throughout the community, these interviewees suggested that the SRPD more purposefully focus on building trust in the Black, Indigenous and People of Color (BIPOC) community. In particular, they think the SRPD should engage and listen to more people and show that they care about the community.



Assessment of the SRPD's Response to the Events

The Department's Planning Activities

The SRPD has a well-established Incident Management Team (IMT) that includes a fully functional planning section that facilitates the development and dissemination of operational plans, also referred to as incident action plans (IAP), for a variety of operations, ranging from wildfires to community service engagements. The SRPD hosts and develops IAPs for between 60 and 70 scheduled events each year, some of which are as large as the Country Summer Music Festival with 15,000 attendees. Additionally, the SRPD develop IAPs for efforts such as Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) callouts, surveillance details and routine law enforcement operations that involve multiple personnel.

The process starts when the IMT commander and/or the Planning Section Chief receive information regarding an event, incident or operation from public officials, officers, the community, open-source reporting or social media monitoring. The Planning Section Chief then conducts a review and analysis to determine the SRPD's response. After the Planning Section Chief completes their review and assessment, they recommend and document a course of action on a pre-incident report (PIR) for submission to the IMT commander.

The IMT commander reviews the PIR and either concurs with the assessment or returns the PIR to the Planning Section Team and requests revisions or additional research. When the IMT commander approves the PIR, they disseminate it to the other commanders for their review and situational awareness. If the review prompts a Department response, the Planning Section Chief develops the IAP. Once the Planning Section Chief completes the IAP, they distribute it to all commanders for their review and situational awareness.

Following George Floyd's death and the subsequent civil unrest across the country, the Planning Section Chief and designated staff began monitoring the national and local reaction. They learned of protests being held in Oakland and San Francisco, and noted no significant issues related to the events. On Thursday, May 28, the intelligence analyst discovered information on social media about a gathering scheduled to take place in Santa Rosa at Old Courthouse Square, a popular destination and the site of past protests regarding the Sonoma County Sheriff's Office's killing of Andy Lopez in 2013.

The Planning Section Chief initially assessed the event and recommended the minimum response – patrol officers monitoring the protest. They based this response largely on the lack of detailed information about the event. The available information did not suggest a large crowd and indicated the protest's focus would be consistent with past protests, such as those for Andy Lopez. The SRPD followed the formalized processes and structures to analyze such information. However, when the IMT commander sent the PIR, the other commanders expressed concern about the lack of a prepared SRPD officer response to potential civil unrest and the lack of a contingency plan for increased officer personnel from partner agencies. The commanders returned the PIR, requesting additional review and the development of an IAP that included significant personnel increases and the



deployment of the SWAT and Mobile Field Force (MFF) teams. Additionally, the commanders recommended the activation of the IMT and Department Operations Center (DOC).

This SRPD's process of distributing the PIR for review prevented any single individual or group from determining the final assessment or recommendation. Instead, the process ensures that a cross-disciplinary and experienced team reviews the Department's response plan for any incident or event, which is a best practice. The SRPD's process proved very beneficial in this situation and allowed for the fast response and asset allocations that the civil unrest eventually required.

On May 29, members of the Planning Section increased intelligence monitoring efforts and developed the IAP. The IMT was notified that it needed to staff the DOC for the scheduled protest on May 30. Command staff designated the Incident Commander, who in turn notified the SWAT and MFF teams to respond for deployment. Additionally, the SRPD assigned some investigative resources to embed with and follow the crowd to provide situational awareness from their position on the ground.

The Department contacted the Sonoma County Sheriff's Office (SCSO) and California Highway Patrol (CHP), both of which designated and assigned officers to the response effort. The fact that the SRPD made this notification and request prior to the planned protest, rather than in response to a growing problem during the event, indicates that good event analysis and management occurred. This allowed the SRPD's mutual aid partners to plan for their response in an organized and thoughtful manner.

Incident Command Operations

The SRPD has a well-established IMT and embraces the concepts and principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS). The Department formed the IMT and MFF in 2013; however, it appears the IMT portion of the Department's operations was not as well developed as that of the MFF at that time. While the MFF participated in training, the IMT did not initially practice NIMS and ICS concepts. Following the Northern California Tubbs Wildfire

Overview of the SWAT and MFF Teams

The SRPD's Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team is a designated group of officers specially trained and equipped to work as a coordinated team to respond to critical incidents, including, but not limited to hostage situations, barricaded suspects, snipers, terrorist acts and other high-risk incidents.

Per Policy 407, the SRPD can deploy the SWAT Team for crowd control and civil disobedience, among other situations.

The SRPD's Mobile Field Force (MFF) team is a designated group of officers specially trained and equipped to work as a coordinated team that rapidly deploy in disorder situations.

Per Policy 409, one of the MFF team's primary duties is crowd control for spontaneous or planned demonstrations or civil disobedience.



in 2017, SRPD leadership understood the need to adhere to precise ICS principles and establish a formal IMT to manage the Department's future responses to events and incidents.

As a result of this renewed focus on the IMT and ICS in 2017, the SRPD appointed members to the IMT and has routinely called upon this team to be involved in the formal planning process for events, incidents and operations across the Department.

On May 30, the SRPD activated the DOC. Well before noon, IMT members began assuming their respective roles. The SRPD contacted the appropriate Information Technology personnel and readied the Department's training room to serve as the DOC by establishing workstations with network connectivity, landline phones and a television to monitor media reports. A portable computer-aided dispatch (CAD) console was also set up in the DOC so the tactical dispatchers could monitor radio communication and document the incident information. Those we interviewed who were in the DOC during the protests and civil unrest noted that at times, too many people were in the room, which made it difficult to hear everything that was happening.

The previously designated IMT members began working in their respective areas, supported by a SRPD captain who had been designated as the Incident Commander.

Because the protests and civil unrest continued for seven consecutive days, the Incident Commander assignment changed due to shift changes. This change in command led to some inconsistencies in operations and the exchange of relevant information to assist with the response efforts. During the first few days of the protests and civil unrest, no formal exchange of information occurred between the incoming and outgoing Incident Commanders. However, by the end of the incident, at the end of each Incident Commander's shift, the IMT discussed lessons learned in the DOC. Had this formal exchange of information between the incoming and outgoing Incident Commanders been formalized earlier during the protests and civil unrest, they could have better prepared for the crowd tactics and helped create more effective law enforcement responses.

The National Incident Management System

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides a framework for "all levels of government, non-governmental organizations and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from incidents."

As a part of NIMS, the Incident Command System (ICS) is a standardized approach to the command, control, and coordination of on-scene incident management and provides a common hierarchy within which personnel from multiple organizations can be effective"



Tactical Command Operations

Planning Efforts

Because the SRPD embraces the ICS in its event and incident management efforts, when it activated the DOC, the Operations Section Chief reported for duty and worked with the broader IMT to develop and define mission objectives. Following the revisions to the initial PIR, SRPD senior leadership decided to deploy the MFF and SWAT teams under the oversight of the SWAT Commander. The senior leadership designated the SWAT commander as the Tactical Commander for the operation to lead the officer response in the field. The Tactical Commander communicates directly with the DOC regarding the execution of objectives and provides intelligence developed from the field perspective.

Span of Control

Based on our assessment, we determined that the span of control, specifically for the Tactical Commander, was challenging and unrealistic the first night of protests and civil unrest. As the events unfolded, the level of unrest, coupled with the number of participants and the geographic area they encompassed, created a situation whereby one field commander could not effectively and efficiently manage resources with the appropriate level of oversight.

Additionally, as more officers arrived, who the SRPD had requested from other law enforcement agencies, the inability to communicate on a common radio channel became an issue. Without radio interoperability, it was difficult for the Tactical Commander to communicate his instructions as the multi-agency squads were spread out across multiple city blocks in Santa Rosa. We commend the Tactical Commander's competence and skill in guiding the field response under the challenging circumstances. However, we and those we interviewed clearly identified that the Tactical Commander's span of control far exceeded reasonable expectations. For the protests that followed, the SRPD assigned additional field lieutenants to provide enhanced span of control and oversight of the officers.

Situational Awareness

The initial protest began in the early afternoon of May 30 with a large gathering at Old Courthouse Square. The IMT engaged in a commendable effort to maintain situational awareness through the use of surveillance cameras mounted in the Old Courthouse Square area and monitored in the DOC, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), SWAT personnel posted on rooftops overlooking the square, officers embedded in the crowd, patrol officers fanned out across the city and field commanders' reports. The SRPD displayed creativity when it leveraged a relationship with a local business to install a portable camera at that business, which provided a view of some activities away from Old Courthouse Square. Although the UAVs proved beneficial in gathering pertinent information during the day, the UAVs were far less beneficial at night. Additionally, Department members learned that operating the UAVs in darkness drained the battery at an accelerated rate, rendering the UAVs essentially inoperable.



Atmosphere Surrounding the Protests

Although the crowd was large, our interviews revealed that individuals remained peaceful and organized at the onset of the May 30 protest. As the protest progressed, the crowd at Old Courthouse Square separated and one group marched to the nearby SCSO facility. During our interviews, officers indicated the group remained peaceful, dedicated to the message of police accountability and focused particularly on the SCSO having shot and killed Andy Lopez. Officers stated that the protest organizers stressed to the participants not to damage property. However, some in the group removed metal barriers around the SCSO facility. Officers said the group at Old Courthouse Square became increasingly agitated as they departed north, eventually joining the group that had been at SCSO near Highway 101 and Steele Lane. The combined group then marched onto the freeway.

The CHP had assigned officers to the Highway 101 area earlier on May 30 as a proactive measure. A large group converged onto the freeway on the northbound and southbound lanes. The CHP requested assistance, and SRPD and SCSO officers responded to assist. The officers moved the group from the freeway, and the group began moving back toward Old Courthouse Square. Upon the group's return to Old Courthouse Square, officers noted a change in the overall attitude and demeanor of the group. Younger, more aggressive participants began arriving, and "sideshow" activity began, which involved reckless and unlawful behavior and motor vehicles stunts that were not directly involved in the protest. This sideshow activity incited the crowd. The SRPD continued to monitor the event as the overall demeanor of the group changed and escalated into more aggressive behavior.

Escalating Crowd Activity

The SRPD and SCSO officers returned from the freeway and staged in a parking lot near Old Courthouse Square out of sight of the protestors. This allowed for a rapid response to Old Courthouse Square; however, it was not close enough for the Tactical Commander to take advantage of the officers observing the activity to establish intelligence to support tactical decisions.

As those in the DOC monitored the activity in Old Courthouse Square from surveillance cameras, they learned that some of the group moved to outside of a restaurant in the square and were setting fires outside and burning flags. The SRPD received a call from a patron dining in the restaurant, reporting the burning of an American Flag and requesting help. The caller said they did not see any police officers and did not feel safe leaving the restaurant. The caller further added that protestors were trying to fight with them. The Incident Commander subsequently instructed the Tactical Commander to advance, thinking they may need to assist in evacuating the restaurant. Given the nature of the activities and the demeanor of the crowd, it was appropriate to send in tactical officers wearing protective gear rather uniformed patrol officers.



As the SRPD MFF team and SCSO deputies advanced toward Old Courthouse Square, individuals in the group observed them. Our interviews revealed that the group immediately focused on the officers and began moving toward them. The Incident Commander decided that the MFF team and SCSO deputies should retreat to avoid a confrontation, based on his evaluation of the crowd's reaction. It should be noted that during this time, the SRPD received information that the occupants of the restaurant were safe. Individuals who we interviewed repeatedly told us that this group appeared to be dedicated to engaging in a confrontation with police, and many officers believed that decision to retreat emboldened the group.

The attitude of the larger group changed again, and officers stated it seemed the group viewed the officers' retreat as a win, which further incited them. The group then marched to the SRPD headquarters, where they spray painted the sign in front of the station. Concerned about an escalation of behavior at the station, a group of SWAT officers who was staged inside, exited and moved toward the front of the station. Interviewees told us that the group acknowledged the presence of the officers and remained for several minutes before departing the area without confrontation. While the larger group was away from Old Courthouse Square, the SRPD took the opportunity to send officers to notify businesses in the area about the situation and assist with getting employees out of the establishments. However, the Department was unsuccessful in some circumstances when they sought access to a business to assist in the evacuation of employees but were unable to reach a point of contact for the business.

The group returned once again to Highway 101. Officers eventually moved the group from the freeway, but not before the group brought vehicular traffic to a stop and assaulted officers with rocks and bottles. The CHP provided repeated dispersal messages to the crowd. At approximately 9:40 p.m., the SRPD Incident Commander authorized the release of a chemical agent to move the group out of the roadway, and officers implemented this crowd-control measure. The larger group began to separate with some remaining in elevated positions near the freeway from which they threw projectiles down onto the officers below. Others spread out through the city streets where they broke numerous windows at the Santa Rosa Plaza retail area as they headed back toward Old Courthouse Square.

Definition of the Rules of Engagement

We learned that the SRPD had not clearly defined the rules of engagement – the decision points regarding whether to engage in and authorize making arrests – in the early days of the weeklong protest. The Incident Commander established overarching decision regarding making arrests, which was that suspects engaged in the destruction of property were subject to arrest. However, the Incident Commander had not clearly defined the extent of damage and type of damaged property would subject an individual to arrest. This lack of clarification proved challenging for the Tactical Commander, as officers essentially followed the group engaging in civil disobedience and destruction from one area of to the next without taking much enforcement action.



As the night wore on, it became apparent to officers and commanders that the protesters from earlier in the day had been replaced with a much younger and aggressive crowd that continued to escalate their behavior. The crowd had already been setting fires, but their actions escalated to property destruction within Old Courthouse Square. At approximately 11 p.m., the Incident Commander ordered officers to advance to the square to address the behavior.

The group met the officers' advance with an attack. As officers approached on 3rd Street to Old Courthouse Square, the group began hurling chunks of broken concrete and steel rebar they were retrieving from a demolition project located within the square. Officers gave dispersal messages and documented the time and date through a CAD entry. Our interviews with officers engaged with the crowd-control efforts revealed it was clear that moving the group from the square was going to be challenging. As the Tactical Commander communicated requests for additional personnel via Code 30, he began the attempt to move the crowd north out of the square. The group engaged in increased violence, launching fireworks and throwing numerous projectiles at the officers. Where possible, officers arrested individuals who the officers observed were engaged in acts of vandalism and assaults on officers. Those assaults on officers resulted in numerous injuries, including officers who were struck by fireworks, a burning road flare and bricks. We believe the officers showed restraint and the command staff strategically controlled the crowds by moving them to alternative locations where they stopped and permitted the assembly to continue, despite the Incident Commander declaring the assembly unlawful.

As the protests and civil unrest wore on, the Tactical Commander remained the primary oversight of the field response. However, after consulting with senior leadership, the Tactical Commander enlisted additional commanders to assist in the subsequent day's operations. The assignment of additional commanders provided for more appropriate span of control and additional oversight of officers in the field.

The Incident Management Team

The most frequently used members of the IMT are the IMT Commander and Planning Section Chief, who are assigned to the SRPD Traffic Bureau. These positions are collateral assignments, but their permanent assignments in the Traffic Bureau align with the IMT roles. The Planning Section Chief is the Special Events Coordinator for the Traffic Bureau. The Planning Section Chief routinely receives notice of all special events, which facilitates their review of the information and development of the

Code 30

The SCSO defines a Code 30 as when an officer needs assistance during an emergency in which the life of a deputy or citizen is in immediate danger.

Officers can issue a Code 30 from any jurisdiction.

The requesting unit cannot cancel a Code 30. A responding unit must assess the condition of the requesting unit and determine if the situation requires further assistance.



PIR to disseminate to the command staff. Staff members who gather intelligence providing relevant information to the Planning Section Chief for review and dissemination.

The Planning Section Chief forwards the PIR to the IMT Commander for review. This process ensures the IMT Commander and Planning Section Chief remain engaged and informed of any events or incidents that may require the activation of the full IMT and the DOC. However, the Operations Section Chief is not routinely involved in operational aspects of events, and rather engages with the broader IMT only when the team is activated. Based on our review of the documents regarding IMT assignments and through interviews, we determined that the SRPD does not fully utilize the role of the Operations Section Chief, which is an integral and often pivotal position in any incident.

Our interviews revealed that during the protests, an operational relationship and dialogue quickly developed between the Incident Commander, who was a captain with extensive knowledge and experience in MFF training and tactics, and the Tactical Commander, who was a lieutenant with significant experience in managing law enforcement crises and emergencies. However, information about what these two individuals were doing did not follow the chain of command and designated structure, instead flowing directly between the Tactical Commander and the Incident Commander. ICS principles would normally require that communications should have flowed through the Operations Section Chief.

Our team learned that the rank structure, as well as the familiar working relationship between the Incident Commander and Tactical Commander, overshadowed the principles of the IMT structure. The Operations Section Chief for the incident was a patrol sergeant who served previously as a Planning Section Chief. The Incident Commander and Tactical Commander did not find it necessary to involve the Operations Section Chief in decision making, especially as this individual had less rank and tactical experience in the operational objectives, but this should have occurred under ICS principles.

During the protests and civil unrest, the role of the Planning Section Chief functioned as designated and in alignment with the SRPD's objectives. The Planning Section Chief was the liaison for intelligence from the field officers, officers embedded in the protest group and the social media monitoring group. Additionally, as the incident unfolded and information surfaced regarding the next planned protest, the Planning Section Chief facilitated the development of the next operational period's IAP. Because the SRPD's designated logistics section chief was not available during the first two days, these duties fell to the Planning Section Chief. This absence further demonstrates the need for the Department to have a more robust command structure to rely upon. With the level of ICS demonstrated across the Department operations, having more command staff would enable leadership to provide opportunities for training and experience for additional officers, ensuring that respective section chiefs can focus on their duties only.



Field Response and Tactics

Command and control² and span of control³ were significant challenges during the protests and civil unrest. The Tactical Commander had oversight of the contingent, which included three squads of 27 officers each. These squads were comprised of SWAT and MFF officers and a sergeant or squad leader. Each squad also included a grenadier, who is the specially trained officer responsible for release of a chemical agent and less-lethal munitions.

On each day of the protests, as the crowd responded to the officers' efforts to move them, individuals would retreat quickly from a current location to another, and then continue their efforts to damage property and throw projectiles at officers. In one instance, an individual removed the metal disc that covers the trash receptacles in the square and readied to fling it like a frisbee at officers, but SRPD officers used less-lethal munitions to stop the individual from throwing the disc. Situations such as these prompted the SRPD to authorize the deployment of less-lethal munitions to protect officers from serious injury or death. Officers attempted to guide and contain the crowd's movement, but the large group continued to move in what appeared to the officers we interviewed to be an organized and choreographed manner.

As officers attempted to move the crowd, it became clear to the Tactical Commander that the urban setting with clearly established city blocks required him to spread the officers into smaller groups that could address the peripheral locations as members of the crowd attempted to circle back behind the officers to return to the square. The practice of preventing protestors from circling back to the initial protest areas, while still allowing egress away from the protest area (the square), is consistent with recognized and accepted crowd control practices. As the larger officer contingent was divided, coupled with the chaotic nature of the group, the integrity of the squads began to degrade. Specifically, officers assigned to a squad were mixed in with other squads as the group quickly moved. Officers struggled to move with the group. In some cases, the grenadiers assigned to perform less-lethal munition deployment for a specific squad were shifted to other areas where clear support was needed to protect officers from flying debris and projectiles. This created situations in which a squad leader was unaware of the addition of these grenadiers to their area of oversight, making it virtually impossible for the Tactical Commander to maintain oversight.

² Command and control is a "set of organizational and technical attributes and processes ... [that] employs human, physical, and information resources to solve problems and accomplish missions" to achieve the goals. Vassiliou, Alberts, and Agre, *C2 Re-envisioned: The Future of Enterprise*, 2015

³ Span of control is the number of individuals for which a supervisor is responsible. It is usually expressed as the ratio of supervisors to individuals. *National Incident Management System, Third Edition, October 2017*.



Due to the number of grenadiers and the munitions deployed over the consecutive protests and civil unrest, resources quickly depleted. The urgency of replenishing the depleted supply out to the field resulted in a diminished level of oversight and accountability. In contrast to SRPD policy, whereby only the training sergeant can issue munitions, multiple officers were engaged in handling and accounting for munitions. The SRPD drafted the policy with good intentions; however, the policy lacked the contingency measures that the sustained protests and civil unrest required. As the squad integrity degraded, the ability to effectively and efficiently assign squads to tasks in support of the broader mission was compromised. Further, the oversight of any single officer proved difficult.

Analysis of the SRPD's Overall Actions

Based on our assessment, the SRPD and assisting agencies exhibited considerable restraint during the seven consecutive days of civil unrest as they faced violent crowds. No lethal force encounter occurred. With each day, a new operational period commenced, and commanders eventually applied information and experience from the previous days with intelligence reporting to guide the ongoing operational response.

The SRPD's focus remained on respecting the group's First Amendment Rights by ensuring a safe environment existed for that peaceful activity to take place. During the period of protests, SRPD command staff experienced some positive interaction with members of the protest groups. The SRPD chief met with a large group in Old Courthouse Square to "take a knee" in solidarity with the group. In another instance, an MFF supervisor approached a protest group leader to ask him to move his group back so the officers could cross the square without confrontation, which he obliged. These isolated interactions occurred during the afternoon. Additional communication proved extremely challenging as a violent response to law enforcement personnel persisted in the evenings from one day to the next. What began as more peaceful afternoon protests escalated each night into activities including blocking roadways and harassing motorists. Individuals surrounded a bus; spray painted cars, buildings and streets; broke windows; and looted local businesses. Each night culminated in violent encounters focused on law enforcement personnel.

The overall safety of the protestors and the community at large remained a key focus of the SRPD. In fact, we learned that the officers routinely interacted with businesses and took decisive measures to prevent the groups from entering residential areas to commit vandalism and other crimes. Further, officers met with and, at times, arrested individuals armed with weapons who approached a protest group, including a white man who marched toward the crowd with a shotgun on his shoulder.⁴ As previously noted, the SRPD did not clearly develop rules of engagement in the early stage of the protests and civil unrest, but the Department revised them for the later stage to allow for a rapid response to sideshow activity and mass arrests for curfew violations.

⁴ California Penal Code 25850 prohibits a person from openly carrying a loaded firearm in a public place or on a public street.



On the fourth night of protests, the Incident Commander ordered SRPD officers to arrest a large group of individuals after officers gave proper and lawful dispersal orders that the individuals were participating in what had become an unlawful assembly.⁵ The mass arrest plan had not been sufficiently reviewed and maintained by the SRPD, and the Department had some internal struggles when facilitating the plan. Ultimately the SRPD designated the arrest processes and responsibilities, and the arrestees were processed accordingly. During our interviews with commanders, they identified this as an issue that they have focused on correcting.

Although the protests continued with some degree of frequency after June 5, we focused on the period from May 30 through June 5. During this time, numerous officers suffered injuries attributed to the protest and civil unrest, as detailed below.

Type of Injury	Number of Officers Injured
Struck by rocks and bricks	7
Struck by bottles	11
Struck in the head by a CS canister	1
Struck by a flare	1
Struck by fireworks	6
Officer's hearing impacted by a megaphone	1

The following table details filed complaints citizens attributed to the protest and civil unrest. Although the protest focused primarily on law enforcement personnel and much of the violent acts were directed at officers, it is reasonable to assume that many individuals would be inclined to voice or file complaints based on their interactions. However, as indicated below, relatively few complaints were filed.

Nature of Complaints	Number of Complaints
Excessive force by impact weapons	6
Traffic stops or illegal detention	2
Tear gas exposure against protestors who stated they were peaceful	2

⁵ Per California Penal Code Section 403.



Mutual Aid Coordination and Response

The SRPD contacted the SCSO and CHP prior to the initial protest, and these agencies designated officers to assist. The SRPD has formal mutual aid agreements in place. An agreement with the SCSO was signed on March 2, 2016, although the terms of the agreement were designated from July 1, 2015 through June 20, 2017. The SRPD is currently negotiating a new mutual aid agreement with the SCSO. An agreement with the CHP was signed February 9, 2018 and does not include an expiration date.

Although the CHP command staff was represented in the DOC, the SCSO's command staff was not, which limited the ability of the IMT to receive comprehensive information when developing operational strategies. Additionally, and more problematic, a consistent, interoperable radio channel was not available for officers from all agencies to communicate with one another.

As the situation escalated, specifically on May 30, the SRPD called a Code 30 to augment the existing mutual aid agreements, and officers from surrounding law enforcement agencies responded. The SRPD established an informal staging location was established at Old Courthouse Square, where officers and their respective supervisors were provided a high-level briefing and then assigned to support the broader initiative of moving and containing the crowd.

The requests for assistance yielded officers from within the county and surrounding counties. To accommodate the radio communication challenges and ensure consistency in operations, these officers were assigned to work with an SRPD squad. This close contact facilitated a more seamless integration of outside agency resources.

After examining the Code 30 requests, we determined that the process was facilitated through a manual process of phone calls. IMT members informally divided up the list of agencies to be contacted and began making calls, requesting assistance and providing a high-level overview. Regarding the possibility of an automated process or the issuance of a standardized emergency communication message via California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) to the other agencies, we were informed that due to the sense of urgency, the SRPD believed such an electronic message may not receive the appropriate level of attention. We agree that given the urgency, the decision and rationale was reasonable. However, we note that a formal request, such as through a CLETS message, provides important documentation that an official request was made, who was contacted and who responded to the call for assistance.



Coordination with Other City-Led Departments

The sideshow activity consisting of reckless operation of vehicles in and around Old Courthouse Square was not only dangerous and unlawful, but it incited the crowd. To thwart that sideshow behavior, the City of Santa Rosa Transportation and Public Works Department provided barricades to block city streets and prevent vehicles from entering Old Courthouse Square and the roadways immediately surrounding it. These barricades were constructed of large plastic jersey barriers filled with water for increased weight.



Plastic Water-Filled Jersey Barrier

After these devices were set in place, individuals simply poked and cut holes in them, draining the water before moving them out of the way. The SRPD quickly assessed this vulnerability and contacted a local contractor for concrete jersey barriers. This process demonstrates the value of quick strategic thinking and the use of the IMT; the need in the field was communicated to the Incident Commander, who delegated execution of the request to the Logistics Chief.

An open and continuous dialogue between city officials can enhance the response to situations like that in late May and early June, as well as help ensure all available resources are considered and made available when appropriate. The City of Santa Rosa, SRPD leaders and their respective Press Information or Public Communications personnel must ensure that the messages put out to residents is coordinated while still allowing each entity to manage the key messages and information the public needs to receive in real time. Interviews with key staff members confirmed that city officials felt that they were provided enough information from the SRPD to ensure the response was coordinated with the city and to communicate appropriate messages to community members regarding the ongoing situation.

Application of National and Statewide Best Practices

Since 9/11, most first responders have received training on emergency response and continue to train on the ICS. At its core, ICS provides an organizational framework for the efficient and effective command, control and coordination of an emergency response for first responders. Paramount to the ICS concept is the implementation of a dedicated command post and incident commander to provide the centralized command of resources and decisions. In complex or large incidents involving multiple agencies with jurisdictional response, a unified command is needed to ensure key players work together to identify and achieve objectives through collaborative strategies.



The principles of ICS are important in the review of the incidents in Santa Rosa because large crowd management is challenging, and crowds can be adaptive. A well-structured command that includes a dedicated incident commander and centralized command post with representatives from assisting agencies and other decisionmakers can significantly enhance the agencies' ability to monitor the situation and engage in face-to-face discussions regarding strategies to support the operation. Our assessment revealed the SRPD excels in embracing the concepts and principles of ICS. It uses the ICS for routine police operations to ensure all the Department personnel are exposed to the process to gain familiarization, competence and confidence to ensure a seamless operation in emergency response or large-scale incidents. To ensure consistent operations and increase officers' familiarity, the SRPD incorporates ICS forms into as many of its operations as applicable. For example, the SRPD uses ICS forms to document IAPs and associated activities, such as the ICS 205 for the radio communications plan. Public safety agencies' adherence to ICS in response to emergencies has become a widely recognized expectation. However, the SRPD's level of effective ICS integration into its operations far exceeds that of other agencies.

Similarly, the SRPD has a designated process for the activation of the DOC, assembly of the IMT and management of an emergency or incident. The SRPD used its training room to serve as the DOC, and although it was not specifically arranged to function in this manner, the Department developed a process for the transition and provided the appropriate personnel and resources to ready the room in a relatively short timeframe. The SRPD has since renovated the space to create an impressive, fully functional, standalone DOC. During our site visit, the SRPD was staffing the DOC to manage its response to the wildfires that had prompted the evacuation of a portion of the city just prior to our arrival. The designation and preparedness plan for the activation of a DOC or Emergency Operations Center (EOC), as the Department also refers to it, is a best practice for law enforcement agencies.

For decades, law enforcement agencies in the U.S. have trained and equipped their officers for riot control. By 2000, leading agencies began developing Mobile Field Force (MFF) teams, which are specially trained units capable of more precise and strategic responses to crowd control issues. However, some smaller agencies do not have the resources to assemble such a team and other agencies may have started the initiative but because civil unrest occurs infrequently in their jurisdiction, they discontinued training or entered into agreements with larger agencies to provide the service when necessary. The SRPD created its MFF in 2013 in response to protests occurring that year.

Although law enforcement agencies do not necessarily need to have a separate crowd-control policy, it is a best practice is to promulgate a policy or policies that clearly establish the department's respect for protecting citizen's First Amendment Rights to Free Speech and Peaceful Assembly. The SRPD does not include such a statement in any of its policies.



The SRPD, like other agencies in Sonoma County, has maintained a robust MFF team and training regimen. SRPD Policy 409 establishes the guidelines for the administration, training and operation of the MFF team. This policy describes deployment protocols, the duties and responsibilities of all personnel assigned to the MFF – ranging from the Incident Commander to a line officer – and training requirements. Although the MFF team is infrequently used, SRPD leadership has maintained a dedicated focus on ensuring the team's preparedness for any potential civil unrest issues. Although we learned from SRPD officers that the level of unrest and violence far exceeded their past experiences, they had a ready and trained team to step forward with confidence to respond to the civil unrest. The formation and continued focus on structured and recurrent training of the MFF team is a best practice.



Recommendations

Rec.	Recommendation
1.1	Revise Policy 308, Control Devices and Techniques to state that the training sergeant or their designee is responsible for inventory control and the issuance of less-lethal munitions to ensure accountability for these weapons.
1.2	Revise Policy 308, Control Devices and Techniques to include a complete description and procedures surrounding the use of all less-lethal and impact devices available for use by trained officers.
1.3	Revise Policy 409, Mobile Field Force to clarify the Department's focus on preserving First Amendment rights and crowd-control management or create a separate policy to address these critical areas.
1.4	Continue the Department's focus on adhering to ICS, including ensuring the SRPD has a sufficient number of command level officers and providing the necessary training and experience to facilitate an effective and efficient performance of the IMT to maintain a strong succession program amongst SRPD supervisors and command officers.
1.5	Ensure the agencies within the county continue to work to adopt an interoperability radio communications plan that supports interagency communications during multiple-agency responses.
1.6	Require that any transfer or replacement of IMT members during a major incident includes the outgoing member providing a detailed situational awareness briefing to the incoming member. Ensuring such an after-action debrief helps with operational consistency and the sharing of pertinent information.
1.7	When requesting assistance from other law enforcement agencies, follow phone calls for assistance with radio broadcasts and an electronic computer message to the recipients to describe the specific nature of the emergency and the resources requested.
1.8	To enhance the DOC operations, install a duplicate computer-aided dispatch (CAD) workstation, rather than a portable workstation, for the tactical dispatchers to use during activations. This would streamline the communications and tactical dispatcher processes.
1.9	When the DOC is activated, ensure only authorized or assigned personnel are permitted entry. Restricting access can limit distractions, excessive noise and offline conversations.



- 1.10** Develop a process to audit and update the point of contact for each business in the city to contact and inform them of emergencies when necessary.
- 1.11** Ensure the mass arrest policy and resources are maintained and the protocol is reviewed and practiced. This would help to ensure competency, effectiveness and timeliness when processing individuals in any mass arrest situation.
- 1.12** Create formal, written operational protocols to guide the SRPD's and City of Santa Rosa's public information officers as they make collective determinations to share information with the public, as well as when it is appropriate for each to communicate messages to the public in real time to meet operational demands or keep the public informed.



Appendix: Timeline of Events

Time	Event
May 25, 2020	
N/A	Minneapolis Police Department officers kill George Floyd while he is in their custody
May 26, 2020	
N/A	Santa Rosa Police Department (SRPD) intelligence analyst begins reviewing and monitoring content related to George Floyd's death
May 28, 2020	
N/A	SRPD intelligence analyst discovers a planned protest at the Santa Rosa Old Courthouse Square that is connected with George Floyd's death The initial pre-incident report (PIR) with event details is developed
May 30, 2020	
N/A	SRPD command staff review the PIR and deploy Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and Mobile Field Force (MFF) teams
12:56 p.m.	Protest begins in Old Courthouse Square with approximately 50 people, increasing to approximately 350 in next 30 minutes Crowd members chant, "Black lives matter"
1:53 p.m.	Large group of protestors march north on Mendocino Avenue
2:38 p.m.	Large group protest group arrives at Sonoma County Sheriffs' Office station
5:26 p.m.	Protest group pulls down metal barriers at Sheriff's Office station
6:14 p.m.	Protestors march to and enter 101 Freeway at Steele Lane, stopping traffic, and remained there for approximately 15 minutes
6:41 p.m.	The SRPD receives report of individuals pulling a woman out of a car
7:35 p.m.	Individual spray paints a car



Time	Event
7:45 p.m.	Red truck reportedly drives through the square, which individuals in the protest chase
7:52 p.m.	Individuals set flags on fire in front of La Rosa Restaurant Restaurant occupants are afraid to leave
8:30 p.m.	Individuals arrive at the SRPD's station and spray paint sign
9:09 p.m.	While on Highway 101, individuals in the protest throw bottles at officers.
9:37 p.m.	California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers give first dispersal order
9:39 p.m.	First chemical agent released to remove protest group from the freeway
10:15 p.m.	Individuals break windows at Santa Rosa Mall
10:30 p.m.	Chemical agent released at Santa Rosa Mall to disperse crowd
11:12 p.m.	SRPD personnel request a Code 30 for assistance
11:30 p.m.	SRPD personnel make four arrests, the first of the incident Individuals march and run through the city Some individuals break windows, paint buildings, cars and streets, launch fireworks and projectiles at officers through early morning on May 31 when the crowd dissipated
11:49 p.m.	Chemical agent deployed at 5th Street and Mendocino Avenue
May 31, 2020	
12:01 a.m.	Chemical agent deployed at 400 block of Mendocino Avenue
12:45 a.m.	Chemical agent deployed at 7th Street and Mendocino Avenue
1:11 a.m.	Individuals break windows at Café Mimosa
12:37 p.m.	Protest begins near Highway 101 and Highway 12 while groups move through city for the next four hours; most of the crowd gathers at the Old Courthouse Square, while other participants reportedly arrive and begin attempting to engage with officers



Time	Event
6:54 p.m.	Individuals recklessly operate vehicles near Old Courthouse Square as part of “sideshow activity” not necessarily affiliated with the protest
8:55 p.m.	Individuals in the crowd launch fireworks in Old Courthouse Square Individuals continue to conduct vandalism in various locations and block intersections Some individuals surround a bus, while others are on building roofs
9:05 p.m.	Individuals in the crowd surrounded a bus at 3rd Street
9:54 p.m.	Individuals break into Forever 21 at Santa Rosa Mall, move to parking structure near Highway 101 and begin throwing branches, bottles and stink bombs down on responding officers
11:07 p.m.	100 individuals reportedly begin looting the Forever 21 and break into other stores (e.g., Macy’s)
11:44 p.m.	Smoke deployed to move crowd back from officers and gives dispersal orders
11:58 p.m.	Chemical agent deployed at 4th Street and Mendocino Avenue and request a Code 30 Individuals continue vandalizing, looting and launching projectiles at officers for about three hours until the crowd dissipates
June 1, 2020	
12:10 a.m.	Chemical agent deployed at Gold’s Gym
12:20 a.m.	Individuals break windows on 7th Street and Mendocino Avenue
12:54 a.m.	Individuals throw rocks at officers
2:08 a.m.	Mall security personnel report individuals returned to attempt to re-enter vandalized stores (e.g., Forever 21)
12:00 p.m.	Protest starts at Old Courthouse Square (e.g., marching, blocking intersections, jumping on cars)
5:15 p.m.	Individuals on Highway 101 stop traffic, and some begin throwing projectiles at officers
5:59 p.m.	Individuals throw glass bottles and rocks



Time	Event
6:34 p.m.	The SRPD requests mutual aid
6:48 p.m.	The CHP reports that 50 to 100 individuals are on the freeway
7:15 p.m.	Individuals damage and drain Jersey barriers placed around Old Courthouse Square to prevent reckless vehicle traffic around protest crowd
8:58 p.m.	Approximately 500 individuals are on ramp at Highway 101 and College Avenue
10:53 p.m.	The SRPD gives dispersal orders and releases chemical agent Crowds move to residential neighborhoods, and the SRPD makes multiple arrests
10:42 p.m.	Officer reports rocks being thrown at the business The Bike Peddler on College Avenue
10:44 p.m.	Report of crowd throwing rocks and bottles at patrol vehicles in the area of Mendocino Avenue and College Avenue
10:45 p.m.	Employee on scene at The Bike Peddler and a window was broken
11:39 p.m.	The SRPD begins making multiple arrests in area of Carrillo Street and Glenn Street
June 2, 2020	
3:28 p.m.	Protests start Individuals block Mendocino Avenue Approximately 50 crowd members move through city, blocking traffic and throwing projectiles at officers (e.g., fireworks)
8:30 p.m.	The SRPD gives dispersal orders and Santa Rosa City Manager gives curfew order The SRPD Incident Commander orders not to deploy chemical agent
9:13 p.m.	The SRPD gives dispersal orders
9:30 p.m.	The SRPD begins making arrests related to the curfew and unlawful assembly
10:25 p.m.	Officers observe individuals filling bottles with gasoline at Chevron on Mendocino Avenue at College Avenue



Time	Event
11:20 p.m.	The SRPD begins mass arrests begin at Mendocino Avenue and Pacific Avenue Officers process the individuals in the parking garage
June 3, 2020	
N/A	Smaller protests occur in Petaluma, Sebastapol and Santa Rosa Law enforcements enforce 8 p.m. curfew Fewer crowds, incidents and arrests occur. Protests continue for several weeks past June 3, but they are small and isolated.